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Why China’s dollar pile has to shrink (relatively soon) 
January 19, 2008 in China Behind the Headline by The China Beat | 2 comments 
James Fallows has a piece in the February, 2008 Atlantic on what he calls “The $1.4 Trillion Question” 
– why China continues to accumulate $1 billion a day in relatively low-return American assets (mostly 
Treasury bills), why this can’t go on forever, and what it could mean if this pattern of investment ends 
abruptly rather than slowly. On the whole, it’s a good introduction, with some useful background on 
the people responsible for making the central government’s investment decisions. (The point that one 
of the two key figures, unlike his counterparts almost anywhere else, has never invested for himself, 
or even bought a house, is a nice touch.) I think the article overdoes its emphasis on a lack of 
transparency in China – the way in which sub-prime mortgages were re-packaged as “AAA” securities 
has made clear that the American financial markets China has been investing in aren’t always that 
transparent, either – but that’s a matter of tone and emphasis. What the article is missing, I think, are 
two important pieces of demographic and historical perspective, which help illustrate the pressures on 
the government. Fallows spends a fair amount of time on changes in China’s mood that may be real 
but are hard to get a handle on — e.g. greater awareness among the population that their 
investments in the US are not earning much money (and some high profile ones have been outright 
losers, like the widely-publicized investment in the Blackstone Group) and that this is money that 
could be used to better things at home – and speculations about how much the government wants to, 
or can, continue resisting those popular desires in the interests of keeping inflation low, etc. I think 
the big story is more structural than that. 
First the demography. Here the key point is one of the great under-played China stories : the rapid 
aging of the Chinese population. For roughly 30 years now, China has had compulsory birth control of 
various sorts, and (as most people reading this probably know) its birth rates declined at a rate that 
has very few historical parallels. So while the number of young people entering the work force every 
year has remained quite high until recently (China had so many births in the 1950s and 1960s that 
even with them having relatively few children per couple when they grew up, birth rates per 1,000 
population stayed high into the late 1980s), the percentage of children in the population became quite 
low. Meanwhile, because Chinese death rates were very high before the Revolution, and stayed pretty 
high into the mid-1960s, there were also relatively few old people. So what economists call the 
“dependency ratio” – the ratio of people in the labor force to people whom workers need to support – 
has been extremely favorable for China over the last couple of decades:it’s now at about 2 workers 
per non-worker, versus about 1:1 for the U.S. But that is now changing pretty quickly (thanks mostly 
to public health improvements under Mao)and China will soon have a fairly old population; by 2030, it 
will have as high a percentage of old people as countries like Italy and Germany today, whose pension 
problems, etc., you read about periodically. [Some of the best work on this is by my UC Irvine 
colleague Wang Feng and Andrew Mason at the University of Hawaii – their paper in a newly published 
Cambridge Press book – China’s Great Economic Transformation, edited by Loren Brandt and Thomas 
Rawski, is well worth a look, though the book won’t be available for a couple more months.] China’s 
dependency ratio will probably reach today’s global average by 2020, and the current U.S. level of 1:1 
by 2030. 
A country with a higher ratio of dependents to workers –like a family in similar circumstances — 
simply cannot save at the same rate as a country with relatively few dependents, no matter what the 
government may want to do and how many provisions it has to siphon the dollars China’s exports earn 
out of the economy and into a massive national savings account. And since China also has plenty of 
investment needs , as Fallows emphasizes – for schools, hospitals, sewers, you name it – it is likely to 
start spending down its dollar hoard before too long, no matter what happens in US-Chinese 
negotiations. Its true that both sides recognize the dangers of this happening too fast – leading to a 
run on the dollar and the collapse of China’s biggest market –but the pressures for it to at least start 
happening soon are even stronger than Fallows lets on. 
That brings us to the history. China, like Japan and Taiwan before it, differs from Europe and the US in 
having undergone very substantial industrialization before its countryside began to empty out. 
(Japan’s rural population kept rising in absolute terms until World War II; China’s until roughly 1998.) 
Thus they were quite industrial before they were heavily urban, in part because they had lots of 
industry in the countryside. (Think of China’s Township and Village Enterprises.) Even today, China 
has a lower percentage of its population in cities than Britain had in 1840. There are all sorts of 
reasons for this – and anyone who becomes a loyal reader of my posts will eventually hear about 
them ad nauseam; but it is likely that in China, as in Japan, this will end with a period of extremely 
rapid urbanization. This rapid urbanization is now really getting underway (you ain’t seen nothin’ yet!), 
as rural industrial job creation slows to a crawl (as it now has) and the rural urban income gap 
becomes so large that even with many barriers to migration remaining, many more people will pick up 
and leave. So far, China’s urbanization rate pretty closely tracks Japan’s, with a 50 year lag – and 
beginning in the mid-1950s, Japan went from about 35% urban to about 70% urban in less than 20 
years. Most people think China is poised to do the same – which will require China’s cities to grow by 
roughly the total population of the US and Mexico combined by 2030. 
And here’s the rub. The Chinese government has worked very hard to avoid creating the kinds of 
slums that ring Mexico City, Manila, Cairo, etc . In fact, this has been one of the few real continuities 
in policy between pre- and post-1978, though the tools used to insure this — outright prohibition of 
migration, guaranteeing land allocations, encouragement of rural industry, phasing out land taxes, 
various local policies that deny rural migrants access to urban services, etc. – have been an ever-
changing mix. To a great extent they’ve been successful in meeting this goal: certainly there are grim 
communities in Chinese cities, but the numbers of people lacking access to electricity hook-ups, 
running water (of whatever quality), etc., is quite low by “third world” standards. This matters, among 
other things, for social and political stability. Maintaining this record as urbanization accelerates will 
require huge amounts of investment. 
Meanwhile, even though the number of new job-seekers entering the labor force each year is now 
declining, China can’t really afford to see job creation slow down, because there is still a lot of labor to 
be absorbed. To go back to the Japan comparison, when Japan’s phase of very rapid urbanization 
began in the 1950s, its unemployment rate was around 2%, so even though people newly arrived in 
the cities faced crowding and other ills, they all had jobs. Nobody knows for sure what China’s urban 
unemployment rate is, but 15% seems like a plausible ball-park estimate. So job growth has to keep 
going, and presumably, most of that growth has to be making things and providing services for people 
in China. And that means a lot of the money now abroad has to come home – no matter how much, or 
little, resentment grows over China subsidizing U.S. over-consumption, or American backlash against 
Chinese ownership of U.S. assets. Nonetheless, Fallows has the main point right — whether this 
happens smoothly or abruptly, and on what timetable, has enormous implications. 
 
